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¶1 Many Americans see their country as a beacon to the world, a country where the 
impoverished, oppressed or persecuted can come for a fresh start and a chance at self-
improvement.  A parallel to the migration of people from around the world to the United 
States is the migration of lawsuits regarding human rights violations from countries with 
inefficient, corrupt or nonexistent judicial systems to U.S. courts.  Since 1980,1 a number 
of foreign litigants with human rights claims have had success using the Alien Tort 
Claims Act (“ATCA”), a once-forgotten provision within the Judiciary Act of 1789 
allowing foreign nationals to sue U.S. citizens or other foreign nationals for violations of 
the law of nations in U.S. courts.2 
¶2 In 1991, Congress passed the Torture Victim Protection Act (“TVPA”) to codify a 
cause of action for a subset of ATCA claims.3  Notably, while the rights of aliens to sue 
under ATCA are expressly constrained only by the provision that they allege a violation 
of the “law of nations,” plaintiffs pleading under TVPA (who can be either aliens or 
citizens) are required to exhaust all local remedies before bringing suit in U.S. courts.4  
The doctrine of exhaustion is widely recognized around the world and has been widely 
praised on the grounds that it supports efficiency, reduces costs to courts and litigants and 
strengthens state sovereignty while providing exceptions for futility, unreasonable delay 
or inadequate available local remedies.5   
¶3 The recent Supreme Court decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain has opened the 
door to expanding TVPA’s exhaustion requirement to all ATCA suits.6  The Ninth 
                                                 
* JD, Northwestern University School of Law, expected May 2008. 
1 See  Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).  
2 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
3 Pub.L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350, historical and statutory notes).  
Congress passed TVPA in response to the ratification of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. See infra  note 88. 
4 Id. 
5 See generally Stephen W. Yale-Loehr, The Exhaustion of Local Remedies Rule and Forum Non 
Conveniens in International Litigation in U.S. Courts, 13 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 351, 358 (1980), Paula Rivka 
Schocket, A New Role for an Old Rule: Local Human Rights Jurisdiction Under the Torture Victim 
Protection Act, 19 COLUM. HUM. RIGHTS. L. REV. 223, 228 (1987) and CHITTHARANJAN FELIX 
AMERASINGHE, LOCAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 71-83 (2d ed. 2004). 
6 See 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004) (“[T]he European Commission argues as amicus curiae that bas ic 
principles of international law require that before asserting a claim in a foreign forum, the claimant must 
have exhausted any remedies available in the domestic legal system, and perhaps in other fora such as 
international claims tribunals  … We would certainly consider this requirement in an appropriate case.”). 
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Circuit Court of Appeals recently provided the first major judicial exegesis of the 
arguments on both sides of the exhaustion debate in Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC. The Ninth 
Circuit held that exhaustion of local remedies is not required under ATCA, in part 
because the exercise of judicial discretion in the field of international venue choice would 
overstep judicial authority since Congress had not spoken on the issue.7  That decision 
was recently re-heard en banc by the Ninth Circuit.8 
¶4 I argue in this casenote that the Ninth Circuit was correct in finding that no 
independent exhaustion requirement exists as a requirement for ATCA under the statute’s 
“law of nations” language, but that the doctrine of forum non coveniens (“FNC”) serves 
all of the purposes and includes all of the elements of exhaustion.  When the Ninth 
Circuit considers Sarei en banc, it should recognize that the common law tests for FNC 
dismissals contains an exhaustion requirement similar to the requirement codified in 
TVPA and that FNC analyses of ATCA claims should be informed by the precedent of 
TVPA exhaustion claims, since the underlying cause of action and the elements of the 
discretionary analysis are so similar.  In deciding against recognizing exhaustion as part 
of an existing prudential doctrine, the court has split exhaustion from its proper place 
within FNC. This could either cause future courts to ignore TVPA’s exhaustion precedent 
or invite the imposition of a separate exhaustion requirement parallel to FNC, creating the 
unduly onerous requirement for plaintiffs to respond to two affirmative defenses. 
¶5 Part II of this case note discusses the Alien Tort Claims Act from its inception as 
part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, through the emergence of its modern fo rm to the 
questions raised by Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC.  Part III discusses the Torture Victim 
Protection Act as an instructive example of how an exhaustion requirement works in an 
international context.  Part IV analyzes the nature of exhaustion in international law, the 
question of whether exhaustion should be read into ATCA, and how the possible methods 
of doing so would impact litigants. 
II. THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT 
A.  ATCA from 1798 to 2003 
¶6 In §9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the first Congress gave the federal courts 
“original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation 
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”9  Although little legislative history 
exists on this portion of the Judiciary Act, ATCA had its philosophical roots in Alexander 
Hamilton’s Federalist 80, where he wrote, “as the denial or perversion of justice by the 
sentences of the courts, as well as in any other manner, it is with reason classed among 
the just causes of war, it will follow that the federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of 
all causes in which the citizens of other countries are concerned.”10  The Supreme Court 
has determined that at its inception, the statute contained a jurisdictional grant over treaty 
                                                 
7 456 F.3d 1069, 1099 (9th Cir. 2006) withdrawn and superseded by Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 487 F.3d 1193 
(9th Cir. 2007).  All references infra are to the 2007 opinion. 
8 See Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC (9th Cir. Aug 20, 2007) (NO. 02-56256, 02-56390). 
9 Supra  note 2. 
10 THE FEDERALIST  80 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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violations and three broad common law causes of action: piracy, violations against 
ambassadors and violation of safe conduct.11   
¶7 In its early history, the ATCA was used sparingly.  Before 1980 only two 
successful cases were brought under the statute. In Bolchos v. Darrel, the District Court 
of South Carolina granted restitution for three slaves seized from a Spanish ship as a 
prize of war.12  In Adra v. Clift, the District Court of Maryland adjudicated the wrongful 
withholding of custody of a child between two aliens as a violation of the law of 
nations.13 
¶8 The number of cases citing ATCA as a basis of jurisdiction remained extremely 
sparse until Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.14 In Filartiga, a Paraguayan doctor living in New 
York sued Americo Pena-Irala, the Inspector General of Police in Asuncion, Paraguay, 
for the torture and death of his daughter, Joelito, in 1976, claiming the killing came as a 
response to Filartiga’s opposition to the regime of President Alfredo Stroessner.15  At the 
commencement of the suit, Pena-Irala was detained in New York for immigration 
violations; the U.S. government deported him while the lawsuit was pending.16  Pena-
Irala’s Paraguayan counsel filed an affidavit stating that Paraguayan courts provided an 
adequate remedy, but Filartiga claimed that such a suit would be futile.17 
¶9 In holding that torture was a violation of the law of nations, the court expanded 
jurisdiction under ATCA to some violations of international law beyond those envisioned 
in the 1789 Judiciary Act.  In determining the new limits of the statute, the court looked 
to sources of international law. The Filartiga decision quoted the statement from The 
Paquete Habana:  
[W]here there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or 
judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized 
nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and 
commentators, who by years of labor, research, and experience have made 
themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they 
treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the 
speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for 
trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.18   
¶10 For additional support of a growing international common law, the court cited The 
Statute of The International Court of Justice, which listed international conventions, 
custom and judicial decisions of foreign nations as sources for international law, all 
allowing torture prosecution. 19  Perhaps recognizing the import of its decision, the court 
commented: “While the ultimate scope of those rights [to sue in U.S. courts for offenses 
committed elsewhere] will be a subject for continuing refinement and elaboration, we 
                                                 
11 See generally Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain 542 U.S. 692 (2003). 
12 3 F.Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795). 
13 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961). 
14 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
15 Id. at 878. 
16 Id. at 879. 
17 Id. at 879-80. 
18 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895)). 
19 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881, n.8. 
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hold that the right to be free from torture is now among them.”20 As a result of Filartiga, 
litigants began to invoke ATCA as an all-purpose cause of action statute for an open-
ended list of international law violations, both commercial and human rights-related, 
testing the limits with varying success. 21   
¶11 Although Filartiga remained the main standard in ATCA jurisprudence until Sosa 
v. Alvarez-Machain more than two decades later, the decision was not without 
controversy and challenge.  The most widely-recognized challenge to Filartiga came in 
Judge Bork’s concurring opinion in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic.22  In dismissing 
claims against the Libyan government, the Palestine Liberation Organization and other 
groups for injuries arising from a PLO attack on several civilian buses and private cars in 
Israel, Bork held that ATCA is purely jurisdictional in nature and that the statute does not 
create a cause of action for individual plaintiffs.23  The scope of possible claims under 
ATCA also ran afoul of the separation of powers, Bork reasoned, because litigants would 
test the limits of international law norms, requiring courts to make decisions on issues 
still controversial enough to be left to the political branches.24  Practical concerns also 
weighed against a private right of action, since a conflict of any size in which one or 
more belligerents engaged in international law violations would result in an unwieldy 
number of cases.25  Although frequently cited, Bork’s analysis has not been widely 
accepted.26 
B. Refining ATCA’s Jurisdiction: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain 
¶12 Filartiga opened the door to new claims under ATCA, but subsequent cases have 
limited the list of possible claims available to individual litigants.27  In 2004, the Supreme 
Court decided Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, in which a Mexican national sued American 
officials for illegal abduction and detention as part of a cross-border drug investigation. 28  
The court held that a single illegal detention of less than one day did not violate a jus 
cogens international norm required for ATCA jurisdiction. 29   
¶13 The court found that the statute created no new causes of action other than the three 
that were widely recognized in 1789 (piracy, crimes against diplomats and violations of 
safe conduct) and violations of widely accepted international law “rest[ing] on a norm of 
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity 
                                                 
20 Id. at 885. 
21 See generally Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1004 (1996) (holding 
genocide, war crimes, summary execution and torture are actionable);  Doe I v. Islamic Salvation Front, 993 
F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding war crimes are actionable); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707 
(N.D.Cal. 1988) (holding that causing disappearances are actionable); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 
197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding environmental degradation and cultural genocide are not actionable); 
and Amlon Metals, Ind. v. FMC Corp, 775 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding environmental torts are 
not actionable).    
22 726 F.2d 774, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 799. 
25 Id. at 810. 
26  See e.g. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1539 (N.D.Cal. 1987) (refusing to adopt Judge 
Bork's reasoning). 
27 Aside from the more general restrictions of Sosa , see generally supra  note 21. 
28 542 U.S. 692, 694 (2004). 
29 Id. at 700.  
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comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms” in place when the law was 
passed.30  Since Sosa’s brief illegal detention lacked the “definite content and acceptance” 
of either the three Judiciary Act-era causes of action or the other causes of action 
recognized in Filartiga and its progeny, the court said it fell outside the outer bounds of 
possible suits under ATCA. 31 
¶14 The defendants in Sosa did not claim non-exhaustion of local remedies or argue 
that exhaustion should be a requirement of ATCA pleadings, but the court said in a 
footnote that “we would certainly consider this requirement in an appropriate case.”32   
¶15 Though Justice Souter’s majority opinion in Sosa contained only a footnote on the 
exhaustion issue, the question of local remedies in Sosa’s case, in relation to ATCA 
claims in general, was discussed thoroughly by the parties and in the numerous amicus 
briefs filed prior to the case.  The European Commission (“EC”) filed a brief on behalf of 
neither party in which it claimed the exhaustion provision in the TVPA (discussed at 
length infra) “endorsed the prevailing interpretation of [ATCA] as a protection against 
other human rights abuses”33 in line with a rule of general international law developed to 
give states the opportunity to remedy violations of international law before losing 
jurisdiction to other states.34  The EC urged the court to allow universal civil jurisdiction 
of the type enabled by ATCA “only when the claimant would otherwise be subject to a 
denial of justice.”35  In other words, jurisdiction should exist when local remedies are 
non-existent or have been exhausted. 
¶16 In a brief on behalf of international human rights and religious organizations in 
support of Sosa’s claim, the University of Virginia International Human Rights Law 
Clinic argued that U.S. courts use other doctrines to weed out cases that belong 
elsewhere.  For example, the forum non conveniens doctrine “requires dismissal of a 
lawsuit if an adequate, alternative forum provides a more efficient venue – a standard that 
inevitably leads to dismissal of claims that do not exhaust available domestic remedies.”36  
C. Post-Sosa Discussion of Exhaustion in ATCA: Sarei v. Rio Tinto 
¶17 The first extended discussion of the ramifications of the footnote in Sosa 
suggesting that an exhaustion requirement may be implicit in ATCA came in Sarei v. Rio 
Tinto PLC, a suit against a British mining company for human rights violations allegedly 
committed by the government of Papua New Guinea (“PNG”) following an uprising at 
Rio Tinto’s Bougainville gold and copper mines.37  The plaintiffs, PNG citizens, filed an 
ATCA suit against Rio Tinto for its vicarious liability in atrocities allegedly committed 
by the PNG military and government at the company’s behest, including racial 
                                                 
30 Id. at 725. 
31 Id. at 738. 
32 Id. at 733, n.21. 
33 Brief for the European Commission in Support as Amicus Curiae of Neither Party at 23, Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, (2004) (No. 03-339). 
34 Id. at 24. 
35 Id. at 26. 
36 Brief of International Human Rights Organizations and Religious Organizations as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, (2004) (No. 03-339) 2004 WL 419422. 
37 See Sarei, 487 F.3d at 1198. 
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discrimination, environmental devastation, war crimes and violations of the United 
Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, among other charges.38 
¶18 The trial court granted Rio Tinto’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the suit for failure to 
state a claim on justiciability grounds.39  In doing so, the trial court did not accept the 
defense’s argument that exhaustion was a requirement under ATCA, calling the statute “a 
creature of domestic law” and stating that a plain reading of the statute contained no 
reference to or inference of an exhaustion requirement.40   
¶19 The defendants also argued in the alternative that the case should be removed from 
U.S. courts on forum non conveniens grounds, claiming PNG, Australia or Britain would 
be adequate alternative forums.41  The court denied the defense request to dismiss the suit 
in favor of a PNG forum, citing the common law balancing of public and private factors 
discussed infra. The private interest factors considered included the likely inability of the 
plaintiffs to obtain a lawyer in PNG, the undue financial hardship associated with hiring 
counsel and difficulties with the discovery process.42  In considering the public interest 
factors, the district court held that the defendants failed to show that PNG courts were 
any less congested than U.S. courts and that requiring U.S. courts to interpret PNG law 
would be more problematic than in other ATCA cases.43  The court noted that denying 
dismissal on FNC grounds was “particularly appropriate given that the case is brought 
under the ATCA and alleges violations of international law.”44  The court also denied 
dismissal in favor of a suit in Australia, since the plaintiffs’ claims were not cognizable 
under Australian law. 45  The district court decision does not discuss the possibility of 
dismissing the case in favor of a British forum. 
¶20 The plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.  Between the trial 
court’s ruling and the circuit court’s review of the case, the Supreme Court published 
Sosa, forcing a re-evaluation of the possibility that non-exhaustion is a valid affirmative 
defense.46   
¶21 The Ninth Circuit looked to ATCA’s legislative history to determine whether the 
drafters of the Judiciary Act assumed an exhaustion requirement.  Majority opinion 
author Judge Fisher cited the Jay Treaty with Great Britain, noting that it was passed 
shortly after the Judiciary Act and contained an exhaustion requirement, the implication 
being that had ATCA assumed exhaustion, including a similar requirement in the Jay 
Treaty would be redundant.47  Fisher then discussed the differences between ATCA and 
TVPA, passed as an amendment to the statute containing ATCA.  The TVPA contained 
an exhaustion requirement that applied only to claims of torture and extrajudicial killing, 
not to any other provisions of the statute.48  When Congress amended ATCA to add 
TVPA, it did not add an exhaustion requirement to ATCA lawsuits that were beyond the 
                                                 
38 Id. at 1197. 
39 See Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC., 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
40 Id. at 1139. 
41 Id. at 1164. 
42 Id. at 1174. 
43 Id. at 1175. 
44 Id. at 1175. 
45 Id. at 1177-1178. 
46 See Sosa, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004). 
47 Sarei, 487 F.3d at 1215. 
48 Id. at 1215-1216. 
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new statute.49  As to whether exhaustion should be a matter of judicial discretion, the 
court said that courts lacked the discretion to add an exhaustion requirement because to 
recognize any judicial discretion for ATCA claims in manners related to jurisdiction 
would overrule Congress’ inaction on the issue by the issuance of a judicial fiat.50 
¶22 On the issue of whether exhaustion is an element of widely recognized 
international law, the court’s majority opinion differentiates the ubiquity of exhaustion 
requirements in international treaties and court opinions from ATCA’s grounding in 
international law by noting that the issues of sovereignty at stake when an international 
body adjudicates a dispute between two signatory nations are not implicated by ATCA 
litigation brought by a foreign national against another in a U.S. court.51 
¶23 The court also reasoned that exhaustion rules, as they exist in international 
tribunals, are strictly procedural.  The majority opinion in Sarei rejects the notion of 
denial of justice as a necessary part of an international claim as advanced in 
Interhandel,52 citing the International Court of Justice case Phosphates in Morocco, 
which held that the responsibility for a substantive harm arose when the harm took place, 
not when local remedies were exhausted.53  The dissent essentially passes on the issue, 
citing international law and secondary sources that fall on both sides of the issue of 
whether exhaustion is substantive or procedural, 54 but concluding that “Sosa’s rule would 
incorporate even procedural exhaustion, because the international community does not 
recognize virtually any ‘violation of the law of nations’ without it.”55  Essentially, the 
dissent concludes that it does not matter whether the doctrine is substantive or procedural 
because, even if it could be deemed “procedural,” it falls into a newly- invented category 
of “super-procedural” doctrine that requires it to be considered a widely accepted norm of 
international law as per Sosa.   
¶24 Issues of international law aside, the majority and dissenting opinions in Sarei also 
differed on whether exhaustion could be used by judges as a prudential doctrine.  In his 
dissent in Sarei, Judge Bybee wrote that exhaustion of local and administrative remedies 
has long been a part of American jurisprudence, but has served as “one among related 
doctrines - including abstention, finality, and ripeness – that govern the timing of federal 
court decisionmaking.”56  Just as the international law doctrine of exhaustion exists partly 
to respect the sovereignty of independent states, domestic exhaustion considerations often 
arise out of a deference to the separation of powers and a concern that adjudicating a 
                                                 
49 Id. at 1222. For additional discussion on the differences between ATCA and TVPA, see generally infra  
notes 84-88. 
50 Id. at 1223. 
51 Id. at 1220 (“[T]he exhaustion limitation imposed on and accepted by international tribunals as a 
requirement of international law is not dispositive as to a United States court’s discretion to impose 
exhaustion as part of the ATCA.”). 
52 Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC., 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1164. 
53 Sarei, 487 F.3d at 1221, citing Phosphates in Morocco (Italy v. Fr.)1938 P.C.I.J. (ser.A/B) No. 74, at 28 
(June 14).  The court also cites AMERASINGHE, LOCAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW at 416 (“Judges 
or states may have made statements supporting the view that the [exhaustion] rule is substantive, but the 
practice of [international] judicial bodies relating to the rule leads overwhelmingly to the conclusion that 
the rule has not been treated as substantive or as both substantive or procedural, but as solely procedural in 
character.”). 
54 See generally Sarei, 487 F.3d at 1234-1235. 
55 Id. at 1236, note 11. 
56 Id. at 1225, (citing McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992), superseded on other grounds by 
statute as recognized in Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001)). 
NORTHWEST ERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS [ 2 0 0 7  
 
 162
matter that has not been fully exhausted in other appropriate channels usurps discretion 
and power from its rightful holders.57  The majority opinion in Sarei dismissed the 
comparisons between domestic and international exhaustion, stating, “We should not be 
lulled into a false sense of familiarity with the term ‘exhaustion’ just because it is the 
same term that we use to describe an analogous doctrine in our domestic law.”58 
¶25 The ruling in Sarei is an important milestone in ATCA jurisprudence since it 
addresses the post-Sosa exhaustion question on three grounds: exhaustion as widely 
accepted international law, exhaustion as a substantive or procedural rule and exhaustion 
as a matter of judicial discretion.  When the Ninth Circuit reconsiders Sarei en banc, it 
will reconsider a decision that discusses these major elements in detail.  But, as discussed 
below, the court’s exhaustion analysis misses one important factor: whether exhaustion 
requirement is already incorporated into an analysis of an existing rule, namely forum 
non conveniens. 
D. Forum Non Conveniens in ATCA Cases 
¶26 Pleadings under ATCA are similar to pleadings under most other statutes with 
regards to venue choice, including the requirement that the court establish personal 
jurisdiction and the doctrine of forum non conveniens (FNC).59 
¶27 FNC is a doctrine that states that a court can “decline to exercise its jurisdiction, 
even though the court has venue, where it appears that for the convenience of the parties 
and the court, and in the interests of justice, the action should be tried in another 
forum.”60  The common law doctrine of FNC is similar to exhaustion as envisioned in the 
TVPA and under international treaties because, like exhaustion, it allows the defense to 
request a case to be dismissed from one court because it belongs in another.61  The power 
to dismiss under FNC “finds its roots in the inherent power of the courts ‘to manage their 
own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.’”62  
¶28 The defendant in Filartiga argued for FNC, arguing that Filartiga’s claim should 
have been brought in a Paraguayan court, to which the plaintiff claimed futility. 63  The 
district court did not address the issue because it dismissed Filartiga’s claims on other 
grounds and as a result, the Second Circuit did not address the issue.64  If it had, it would 
have likely come to the same conclusion as it did without the decision: that Filartiga 
could pursue his claims in U.S. federal court.  This is because FNC is so similar to 
exhaustion in form and function.   
                                                 
57 Id. at 1226, (citing Pavano v. Shalala, 95 F.3d 147, 150 (2d Cir. 1984)) (“Parties are generally required to 
exhaust their administrative remedies, in part because of concerns for separation of powers.”). 
58 Id. at 1220, n.31. 
59 See In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d 493, 502 (9th Cir. 1992). 
60 Ford v. Brown, 319 F.3d 1302, 1306-7 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Sibaja v. Dow Chem. Co., 757 F.2d 
1215, 1218 (11th Cir. 1985)).  
61 Sarei, 487 F.3d at 1237, n.12, (c iting Menendez Rodriguez v. Pan American Life Insurance Co., 311 F.2d 
429, 433 (5th Cir. 1962) (finding Cuban courts are a more suitable forum for a claim brought by political 
refugees)), vacated on other grounds, 376 U.S. 779, 84 S. Ct. 1130, 12 L. Ed. 2d 82 (1964). 
62 Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M. v. NAK Naftgaz of Ukraine, 311 F.3d 488, 497 (2d Cir. 2002) 
quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc. 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991). 
63 Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 23, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 19 I.L.M 585, reprinted in 12 HASTINGS 
INT’L & COMP . L. REV 34 (1988) (E.D.N.Y. 1979). 
64 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 879. 
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¶29 Adjudicating FNC motions is a two-part test in which the defendant has the burden 
of proving that the factors weigh in their favor.65  The first part of the test is to determine 
whether there is an “alternative forum” available to the parties. FNC “presupposes at least 
two forums in which the defendant is amenable to process,”66 so a court that dismisses a 
lawsuit on FNC grounds must first ascertain that an alternative forum exists.67  Even if 
such a forum exists, it will be considered inadequate “where the plaintiff demonstrates 
that he would encounter exceptional legal, political or practical barriers in litigating in the 
other forum, such as the prospect of execution or a justice system closed to him as a 
member of an outcast class.”68  An inadequate forum is “characterized by a complete 
absence of due process or an inability of the forum to provide substantial justice to the 
parties.”69  This language is extremely similar to language used by courts evaluating 
whether suits brought pursuant to the TVPA should be dismissed for failure to exhaust 
local remedies.70 
¶30 The second part of the test involves a weighing of public and private interest 
factors.  As listed in Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, relevant "private interests" include: (1) the 
private interest of the litigant; (2) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (3) the 
cost and availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses; (4) the 
possibility of view of premises where the actions in question took place; (6) “all other 
practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive;” and (7) 
the enforceability of a judgment.  Public interest factors include the congestion of courts 
and the difficulty of a court interpreting the law of another jurisdiction. 71  Later cases 
have also included within the scope of FNC inquiry which venue “will serve the ends of 
justice” and whether “litigation may be conducted elsewhere against all defendants” in 
the proposed alternate venue.72  These factors are almost identical to those that inform the 
doctrine of exhaustion. 73  In the realm of human rights cases pursued under the TVPA 
discussed infra, exhaustion defenses have not to date hinged on unsatisfactory results in a 
foreign court, but the inability of a plaintiff to sue in a foreign court due to intimidation, 
excessive delay, statutory immunity or lack of due process.   
                                                 
65 Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 100 (2d Cir. 2000).  
66 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert , 330 U.S. 501, 506-7, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947), superseded by 
statute on other grounds as recognized in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp ., 725 F. Supp. 
317 (S.D.Miss. 1989). 
67 Murray v. BBC, 81 F.3d 287, 292 (2d Cir. 1996). 
68 Turedi v. Coca Cola Co., 2006 WL 3187156 (S.D.N.Y.) (citing Rasoulzadeh v. Associated Press, 574 F. 
Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d 767 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1985)). 
69 Monegasque, 3111 F.3d at 499.  See also  Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp, 381 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 
1143 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (finding “[a]n alternative forum is inadequate if the claimants cannot pursue their 
case without fearing retaliation”) citing Aldana v. Fresh Del Monte Produce, et al. No. 01-3399, slip op. at 
4 (S.D. Fla. Jun. 5, 2003) (finding that a “credible threat of retaliatory violence against Plaintiffs” renders 
the alternative forum in Guatemala insufficient) and Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 
Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding the alternative forum of Sudan inadequate partly 
because the plaintiffs “would be endangered by merely returning”). 
70 Pub.L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992). 
71 Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508. For purposes of ATCA, the choice of law factors are irrelevant under the Sosa  
construction of ATCA, since the law being applied is international law, recognized by all civilized nations. 
72 PT United Can Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 138 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 1998). 
73 See e.g. Schocket A New Role for an Old Rule: Local Human Rights Jurisdiction Under the Torture 
Victim Protection Act, 19 COLUM. HUM. RIGHTS. L. REV. at 227 (1987) (“[exhaustion] assumes local 
adjudication is speedier, less expensive, and more effective.”). 
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¶31 The seven “private interests” Gilbert factors tend to argue in favor of pushing 
ATCA cases out of American courts and into the judicial systems of countries where the 
actions on which ATCA claims are based took place.   However, courts are amenable to 
hearing human rights cases under ATCA despite the presence of another forum because 
the Gilbert “public interest” factors should also include a consideration of policy interest 
in providing a forum for such cases.  In Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals overturned a district court dismissal on FNC grounds partially 
because Congressional action in passing the TVPA shows a policy preference for hearing 
claims of violations of international law in the United States.74 
¶32 As is the case with other causes of action, FNC is an obstacle to ATCA plaintiffs. 
An illustrative example is Abdullahi v. Pfizer, in which a group of Nigerian citizens 
received an experimental antibiotic without their knowledge during an epidemic.75  The 
district court dismissed on FNC grounds since the plaintiffs were pursuing a parallel suit 
in Nigerian courts, which provided a more appropriate forum.  The defendant, Pfizer, 
Inc., claimed that Nigeria’s Kano Federal High Court was a more appropriate forum. The 
plaintiffs responded that the Nigerian court lacked a “modicum of independence and 
impartiality necessary to ensure that the remedy available in the alternative forum [is not] 
so inadequate to amount to no recovery at all.”76 
¶33 Citing Piper Aircraft v. Reyno,77 the court said the traditional preference for a 
forum closer to where the acts in question allegedly took place could be defeated under 
“rare circumstances” when “the remedy offered is clearly unsatisfactory,” and “if the 
plaintiff shows that conditions in the foreign forum plainly demonstrate that ‘plaintiffs 
are highly unlikely to obtain basic justice therein.’”78  The district court found the 
Nigerian court the preferable venue.79  In doing so, the court found that the plaintiffs’ 
conclusory statements about the independence of the Nigerian judiciary were insufficient 
to defeat the defendant’s FNC motion. 80   
¶34 However, plaintiffs have successfully used arguments such as those made by the 
plaintiffs in Abdullahi to defeat FNC motions.  In Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 
plaintiffs defeated an FNC motion by citing documents including a State Department 
Human Rights Report for Colombia, the proposed alternate venue, that listed intimidation 
of judges, prosecutors and witnesses as a major problem for that country’s judicial 
system. 81  The defense argued that the documents were inadmissible under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, but the court held that it had the discretion to review the documents in 
considering a motion to dismiss for FNC.82  Similar tactics have been used to defeat 
exhaustion claims under TVPA. 83 
                                                 
74 226 F.3d 88, 108.  It should be noted that the plaintiff in this case alleged torture, which would have been 
actionable under TVPA had the defendant been an individual, but since the defendants are corporations, 
ATCA provided the cause of action.  
75 2002 WL 31082956 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), upheld in part, vacated in part, 77 Fed.Appx. 48 (2d Cir. 2003). 
76 Id. at *6 (citing Plaintiff’s Mem. in Opp. at 29.). 
77 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981). 
78 Abdullahi, 2002 WL 31082956 at *8. 
79 Id. at *10. 
80 Id. at *9. 
81 Mujica, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1144. 
82 Id. at n.4. 
83 See infra note 91. 
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III. THE TORTURE VICTIM PROTECTION ACT OF 1991 
A. TVPA Generally 
¶35 In 1991, Congress passed the TVPA, which created a specific cause of action for 
victims of torture or extrajudicial killing in foreign countries and for the first time gave 
U.S. citizens a cause of action for international law violations outside the country. 84  In 
doing so, it carved out a piece of ATCA’s jurisdictional and cause of action grants and 
subjected plaintiffs pleading under the act to an exhaustion requirement that is not clearly 
under ATCA.  The exhaustion provision states, “[a] court shall decline to hear a claim 
under this section if the claimant has not exhausted adequate and available remedies in 
the place in which the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred.”85 
¶36 The Senate report accompanying TVPA acknowledges that torture and extrajudicial 
killing violate the law of nations and are actionable under ATCA, citing Filartiga.86  In 
noting that the statute gives jurisdiction and a cause of action to federal courts for a class 
of actions over which they already have both, the report claims a statute providing a 
specific grant is needed (1) because Judge Bork’s concurrence in Tel-Oren threatened the 
private right of action under ATCA; and (2) to be in clear compliance with the 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (the Torture Convention).87 
¶37 Under TVPA, filing a claim in a U.S. court is “virtually prima facie” evidence of 
exhaustion of local remedies, but non-exhaustion can be used as an affirmative defense. 
If non-exhaustion is claimed, the burden is shifted to the plaintiff to show that remedies 
were “ineffective, unobtainable, unduly prolonged, inadequate, or obviously futile.”88  
The Senate report said the provision “can be expected to encourage the development of 
meaningful remedies in other countries.”89 
¶38 The TVPA did not repeal ATCA, but courts have interpreted it to supersede ACTA 
in cases of torture or extrajudicial killing involving both citizen and alien plaintiffs.  In 
Enaharo v. Abubakar, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that TVPA “hold[s] the 
field” due to the presence of an additional requirement for the cause of action, namely 
exhaustion. 90  If plaintiffs could choose whether to file a claim under TVPA or ATCA, 
the court reasoned, the lower requirements of ATCA would make TVPA redundant.  
However, the court left the door open for TVPA’s redundancy (and for the inclusion of 
an exhaustion requirement in ATCA) by noting “it may be that a requirement for 
exhaustion is itself a basic principle of international law.”91 
¶39 Judge Cudahy’s dissent in Enaharo provides an alternate view of the TVPA’s 
relationship to ATCA.  Citing the canon of construction positing that repeals by 
                                                 
84 See Pub.L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992). 
85 Id. at note 2a. 
86 S.Rep. 102-249 at 2 (1991). 
87 Id. at 5; see also  Torture Convention, Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, at 
197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984). 
88 Id. at 10. 
89 Id. at 5.  
90 408 F.3d 877, 884 (7th Cir. 2005), cert denied 546 U.S. 1175 (Feb 21, 2006) (NO. 05-788). 
91 Id. at 886.  This raises the question of whether the discovery of an exhaustion requirement in ATCA, 
through international law or FNC, would render TVPA redundant in form and function for all cases not 
involving American citizens. 
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implication are disfavored, Judge Cudahy interpreted the TVPA as creating a new cause 
of action for litigants who have been torture victims in other countries.92  
B. Exhaustion under TVPA 
¶40 The operation of the TVPA’s exhaustion requirement may be a good indicator of 
how exhaustion would operate under ATCA should such a requirement be read into the 
statute.  TVPA case law shows the difficulties of requiring U.S. courts to sit in judgment 
of foreign legal systems and the relative ease with which most plaintiffs can defeat the 
non-exhaustion defense.  Compared with the difficulty many plaintiffs face defeating 
FNC motions, the exhaustion defense, as it operates under TVPA, is often a mere 
formality.  This leads to the conclusion that if the factors considered in an exhaustion 
analysis were added to the balancing of factors implicit in the FNC test, a greater number 
of ATCA plaintiffs would survive FNC motions. 
¶41 In Abiola v. Abubakar, the difficulties inherent in evaluating a foreign judicial 
system were mitigated by the fact that the alternate forum in question, Nigeria, publishes 
laws in English and has a familiar common law system.93  Despite these advantages, the 
court’s determination that the plaintiffs were excused from exhausting local remedies 
exposes some common issues encountered in the process of adjudicating an exhaustion 
defense. 
¶42 The plaintiffs in Abiola were all Nigerian citizens who claimed that either they or 
their parents were tortured by the military junta that ruled their country between 1993 and 
1999 for their pro-democracy views or activism.94  The defendant, General Abdulsalami 
Abubakar, was a member of the regime and its leader for the last year of its reign before 
the restoration of civilian authority and stood accused of ordering their torture.  Among 
other defenses brought by Abubakar, he claimed that local remedies available in Nigeria 
had not been exhausted by the plaintiffs.  To adjudicate these claims, the court held an 
evidentiary hearing at which both sides called witnesses who professed expertise with 
Nigerian law to help the court decide on Abubakar’s exhaustion defense.95 
¶43 Abubakar called Nigerian commercial lawyer Adebayo Adaralegbe, who testified 
that Nigeria’s 1999 constitution is retroactively effective and allows plaintiffs to sue 
under its human rights provisions for violations that occurred during the military junta’s 
reign. 96  Specifically, the cons titution states that “any person who alleges that any of the 
provisions of [the chapter of the constitution dealing with fundamental rights] has been, is 
being or likely to be contravened in any State in relation to him may apply to a High 
Court in that state for redress.”97  Adaralegbe also testified that while the military junta 
abrogated provisions of a previous constitution protecting fundamental human rights, the 
regime’s assent to the African Charter created an avenue for suit, as does the Nigerian 
common law of torts, which has a six-year statute of limitations in Lagos state.98 
                                                 
92 Id. at 887. 
93 435 F. Supp. 2d 830 (N.D. Ill 2006) (Abiola II), cert. denied 546 U.S. 1175 (2006). 
94 Id. at 832. 
95 Id. at 833. 
96 Id. 
97 Const. of Nigeria, §46, Ch. IV (1999). 
98 Abiola, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 833. 
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¶44 The plaintiffs called Nigerian human rights lawyer Femi Lalana, who agreed with 
Adaralegbe about his interpretation of the African Charter and the common law, but 
claimed that another Nigerian statute, the Public Officers Protection Act (POPA), 
imposed a statute of limitations of three months and that the 1999 constitution is not 
retroactive for human rights violations committed by the military junta.99 
¶45 In finding that local remedies in Nigeria were futile, the court agreed that the 
POPA’s short statute of limitations applied to the plaintiff’s case and that Nigeria’s 
common law of torts was a futile avenue for relief because the country’s judicial system 
was largely corrupt, intimidated and ignored, even after the transition to democracy. 
Citing the U.S. Department of State country reports for Nigeria between 2000 and 2005, 
the court said, “during the time of the regime, military decrees barred Nigerian courts 
from calling into question the regime’s actions, and that ‘even if a courageous judge 
might have proceeded despite the military decrees … the military routinely ignored any 
occasional judgments that may have been issued against the government.’”100  
¶46 Abiola objected to the over-reliance on the State Department’s country reports, 
noting that the reports’ language changed little from year to year and were subject to 
political judgment.  The Seventh Circuit expressed similar concern on over-reliance on 
country reports in several cases.101  Despite the objection, the court held that the plaintiffs 
had met their burden in responding to the defendant’s affirmative defense of non-
exhaustion. 102 
¶47 The use of evidentiary hearings to evaluate foreign judicial systems as seen in 
Abiola is not standard practice in TVPA cases.  In Xuncax v. Gramajo, seven Guatemalan 
expatriates and one U.S. citizen sued Guatemala’s former Minister of Defense for 
atrocities committed under his watch against that country’s Kanjobal Indians.103  The 
Guatemalans sued under ATCA and did not plead exhaustion.  The U.S. citizen, Dianna 
Ortiz, sued under TVPA since ATCA does not provide a cause of action for U.S. citizens.   
¶48 In finding Gramajo liable and awarding $3 million in compensatory damages, the 
court addressed the issue of exhaustion, finding that Ortiz lacked sufficient remedies in 
Guatemalan courts.  However, unlike Enaharo and Abiola, the court did not cite any 
Guatemalan statute or constitutional provision blocking a cause of action.  To the 
contrary, Ortiz traveled to Guatemala in 1992 to testify in a criminal case against 
Gramajo that had languished without progress for several years.  Since Guatemalan 
courts do not allow civil actions until final judgment in the criminal action has been 
reached, the court found that delays in the criminal case were sufficient to prove 
exhaustion of local remedies.104 
¶49 Even the existence of a judgment against a TVPA defendant in the country where 
the actions at issue occurred does not necessarily serve as a bar against suit in a U.S. 
court.  In Jean v. Dorelein, the plaintiffs won a legally binding judgment in a Haitian 
court in 2000, in which the defendant, a Colonel in the Haitian Armed Forces and Chief 
                                                 
99 Id. at 834. 
100 Id. at 837. 
101 See generally Zheng v. Gonzalez, 409 F.3d 804, 811 (7th Cir. 2005), Lin v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 748, 754 
(7th Cir. 2004) (on whether State Department reports should be trusted in relation to other evidence). 
102 Abiola, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 838. 
103 Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass 1995).  
104 Id. at 178. 
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of Personnel, was found liable for an attack on civilians in Raboteau, Haiti, in 1994.105  In 
reversing the district court’s dismissal on non-exhaustion and other grounds, the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals noted that since the 2000 ruling, Dorelien was freed from prison 
during an uprising and the judge who prosecuted the case had been attacked by a violent 
mob.  Citing the Senate report’s statement on the burden of proof for the non-exhaustion 
defense, the court found that the defendant had not met his burden that the plaintiff could 
presently file a successful case in Haiti.106    
¶50 In cases where the defendants have not made a claim of non-exhaustion of local 
remedies, the Senate report’s statement that the filing of a suit under TVPA is virtual 
prima facie evidence of exhaustion has been followed by federal courts.107 
¶51 Even when courts have found that some local remedies do exist and are functional, 
they do not automatically serve as proof of non-exhaustion.  Defendants in a suit for 
human rights violations related to an oil project in Nigeria cited the existence of the 
Oputa Commission108 as an “alternative remedy” for plaintiffs denied justice by a corrupt 
judiciary.  However, since the Commission’s main purpose “is not to remedy [human 
rights] violations, but to promote reconciliation,” the defendant’s burden of proof had not 
been met.109 
¶52 While most defendants either fail to claim non-exhaustion or fail to meet the 
burden of proof, there are examples where courts have found in the defendant’s favor.  In 
Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., the mother of a peace activist killed by an Israeli bulldozer 
while standing in front of it to block the demolition of Palestinian homes in the Occupied 
Territories sued the bulldozer’s manufacturer on the grounds that it knew of and helped 
the Israeli military commit extrajudicial killings using their products.110  
¶53 In claiming non-exhaustion, the defense reply in support of the motion to dismiss 
noted that the TVPA exhaustion requirement is not met simply by arguing that the 
foreign court is not amenable to claims under international law, but that a “similar” claim 
must be available in the proposed alternative forum. 111  Additionally, the brief cites the 
fact that 700 suits by Palestinians regarding the Israeli government’s activities in the 
Occupied Territories were pending in Israeli courts at the time and that Corrie had a suit 
pending in Israeli court.112  The district court accepted the defense’s non-exhaustion 
argument (among others), adding that Israeli courts “are generally considered to provide 
an adequate alternative forum for civil matters.”113 
                                                 
105 Jean v. Dorelien, 431 F.3d 776, 782 (11th Cir. 2005). 
106 Id. at 783. 
107 See generally Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345  (S.D. Fla. 2003) (Suit not 
dismissible for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on non-exhaustion grounds because defendant failed to 
claim non-exhaustion.  However, the suit was dismissed on other subject matter grounds). 
108 A government commission on human rights violations occurring during the period of military rule. 
109 Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co ., 2002 WL 319887 at *18 (S.D.N.Y.). 
110 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019 (W.D. Wash. 2005) affirmed by Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 2007 WL 2694701 (9th 
Cir. 2007).  The 9th Circuit decision upheld the district court’s dismissal of the suit on political question 
doctrine grounds and thus did not address the issue of exhaustion. 
111 Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss by Defendant Caterpillar Inc. pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6) for Failure to State A Claim and Pursuant to the Political Question and Act of State Doctrines, 22, 
2005 WL 2889368 (Sept. 22, 2005) (citing Xuncax, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 1267).  See also  Reyno, 454 U.S. at 
254 n.22 (1981) (on the adequacy of foreign remedies that are not exactly analogous to the domestic 
equivalent). 
112 Id. 
113 Corrie, 403 F. Supp.2d at 1026 (citing Diatronics Inc. v. Elbit Computers, 649 F. Supp. 122, 127-9 
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¶54 In the fifteen year history of the TVPA, exhaustion has never been a particularly 
effective affirmative defense.  Suits under the Act are far more often defeated on the 
grounds that the alleged torture was not committed “under color of law,”114 or that TVPA 
applies specifically to “individuals” and not corporations or government agencies.115  On 
its own, the requirement that a plaintiff exhaust local remedies has not been particularly 
difficult to defeat by plaintiffs due to the placement of the burden of raising the issue on 
the defendant and the significant nexus between countries where torture and extrajudicial 
killing take place and countries with non-functioning, poorly-functioning or corrupt 
judicial systems.  It can be argued that the rate of success among TVPA plaintiffs in 
defeating non-exhaustion defenses is a result of venue selection that takes exhaustion into 
account, but such a claim would be problematic to evaluate objectively.   
C. Forum Non Conveniens under TVPA 
¶55 As discussed supra, the doctrine of forum non conveniens is often a major obstacle 
for litigants pleading under ATCA.  However, due to a more detailed legislative history 
favoring the adjudication of specific causes of action in U.S. courts, plaintiffs pleading 
under TVPA are less likely to have their cases dismissed on FNC grounds.   
¶56 For example, the trial court in Abiola refuted an argument made by the defendant in 
favor of FNC by citing the House of Representatives report for TVPA, which states in 
part, “A state that practices torture and summary execution is not one that adheres to the 
rule of law. The general collapse of democratic institutions characteristic of countries 
scourged by massive violations of fundamental rights rarely leaves the judiciary 
intact.”116  
¶57 In Wiwa, the trial court dismissed the case on the grounds that U.S. courts are an 
inappropriate venue for a suit between Nigerians residing in the U.S. and a corporation 
based in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands over actions occurring in Nigeria.117  In 
overturning the lower court’s decision, the Second Circuit noted the reports 
accompanying TVPA articulate a policy preference favoring litigation of torture and 
extrajudicial killing cases in U.S. courts, writing, “[i]f in cases of torture in violation of 
international law our courts exercise their jurisdiction conferred by the 1789 [Judiciary] 
Act only for as long as it takes to dismiss the case for forum non conveniens, we will 
have done little to enforce the standards of the law of nations.”118    
                                                                                                                                                 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986)), Postol v. El-Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 690 F. Supp. 1361 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
114 See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp, 393 F. Supp. 2d 
20 (D.D.C. 2005). 
115 Unlike the TVPA, ATCA does allow suits against corporations. See NCGUB v. Unocal, 176 F.R.D. 329 
(C.D. Cal. 1997).  For dismissals of cases alleging non-individual liability under TVPA, see Collett v. 
Socialist Peoples' Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 362 F. Supp. 2d 230 (D.D.C. 2005) (TVPA does not apply to 
government agencies as defendants); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 382 
(E.D.La.1997) (hold ing TVPA does not apply to corporations as plaintiffs). 
116 Abiola v. Abubakar, 267 F. Supp. 2d 907, 918 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 102-367, pt.1, at 3 
(1991)). 
117 Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 99. 
118 Id. at 106. 
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IV.  ANALYSIS: DOES SAREI GET IT RIGHT?  
A. Exhaustion as Widely Recognized International Law 
¶58 The dissent in Sarei argued that since the causes of action available under ATCA 
derive from widely recognized international law, and since exhaustion requirements exist 
throughout international law, exhaustion should be required under ATCA. 119  There is a 
large volume of material that speaks to the notion that the doctrine of exhaustion is a 
well-developed standard in international law.   
¶59 For example, the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms has an admissibility requirement that includes exhaustion: “The Court may 
only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to 
the generally recognized rules of international law, and within a period of six months 
from the date on which the final decision was taken.”120  Under the Convention, an 
individual must pursue both administrative and judicial remedies; these are considered 
exhausted when: (1) the highest competent domestic court grants a final and unappealable 
decision; or (2) when an individual applicant can prove available remedies are inadequate 
or ineffectual; or (3) when an applicant claiming human rights violations can prove the 
probability of failure.121  The Convention has a stricter exhaustion requirement than the 
TVPA, since the respondents’ failure to raise a non-exhaustion defense does not waive 
the right to do so at a later time, and the trying body has an ex officio duty to determine 
whether local remedies have been exhausted, a duty not required of U.S. courts 
adjudicating TVPA claims.122  
¶60 Several other treaties specifically require exhaustion before international human 
rights bodies may hear a case.  For example, the United Nations Convention on 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination provides: 
The Committee shall deal with a matter referred to it in accordance with 
paragraph 2 of this article after it has ascertained that all available 
domestic remedies have been invoked and exhausted in the case, in 
conformity with the generally recognized principles of international law.  
This shall not be the rule where the application of the remedies is 
unreasonably prolonged.123 
The Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture states: 
After all the domestic legal procedures of the respective State and the 
corresponding appeals have been exhausted, the case may be submitted to 
                                                 
119 Sarei, 487 F.3d at 1231. 
120 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 
Art. 35, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, available at  http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm (last 
visited Dec. 1, 2006). 
121 Paula Rivka Schochet, A New Role for an Old Rule: Local Remedies and Expanding Human Rights 
Jurisdiction Under the Torture Victim Protection Act, 19 COLUM. HUM. RIGHTS L. REV. at 248 (1987). 
122 Id. at 249. 
123 U.N. Convention on Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Art. 11, Para. 3, 5 I.L.M. 350 (1966). 
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the international body whose competence has been recognized by that 
State.124 
And the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights specifies that: 
[T]he Committee shall deal with a matter referred to it only after it has 
ascertained that all available domestic remedies have been invoked and 
exhausted in the matter, in conformity with the generally recognized 
principles of international law.  This shall not be the rule where the 
application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged.125 
¶61 The language of these exhaustion clauses is important to note because of the 
common allusions to “generally recognized principles of international law.”  These 
references weaken the claim that the codification of exhaustion requirements in treaties 
speaks to the requirement being non-standard. 
¶62 However, there are several differences between ATCA and the above-referenced 
treaties that make their statutory language less than fully applicable to the question of 
whether ATCA should recognize exhaustion as a substantive element of international 
law.  First and foremost, in all cases that come before the human rights bodies in the 
treaty language cited above, the defendants are states, not individuals.  ATCA, however, 
does not allow for litigation against states.  Additionally, the treaties apply to signatory 
nations that have agreed to allow their citizens to make claims in a supernational judicial 
system.  As a result, the exhaustion requirement behaves more like a procedural barrier to 
suit in a particular court than a substantive basis of a claim, especially in human rights 
cases. 
¶63 Even if exhaustion is an international law norm, U.S. courts may not apply it if it is 
strictly procedural in nature and not a substantive part of a cause of action.  Some argue 
that the exhaustion of local remedies is either substantive or procedural depending on 
what type of offense is committed.  Fawcett argued that international law violations fall 
into three distinct categories: (1) cases where international law is alleged to be breached, 
but not any local law in which case exhaustion is not applicable; (2) cases where the 
breach is local but not international in nature, in which case exhaustion is a substantive 
bar that prevents international adjudication until a denial of justice is committed by the 
state; and (3) cases where the breach is of both local and international law in which case 
exhaustion is procedural in nature, except in cases where the state seeks a declaratory 
judgment that no violation of international law has taken place.126  
¶64 Since international human rights claims by individual litigants were unknown at the 
time Fawcett addressed the issue, his analysis is limited in usefulness by its context; 
namely, international commercial disputes and disputes arising under bilateral or 
multilateral treaties.  Human rights violations are both international and local in nature, 
whether or not the laws of the nation in which the violation occurred are enforced.  If 
                                                 
124 Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, 25 I.L.M. 
519, Art. 8 (1986). 
125 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 41, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967). 
126 J.E.S. Fawcett, The Exhaustion of Local Remedies: Substance or Procedure? 31 BRIT . Y.B. INT’L L. 
452, 457-8 (1954). 
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exhaustion is procedural, it means that the doctrine merely assigns responsibility between 
courts.  If it is substantive, it is part of the claim that brings the litigant to the court.   
¶65 If the denial of justice on the local level necessitates the international claim, then it 
stands to reason that exhaustion of local remedies is indeed substantive in nature.  The 
Interhandel court also takes the substantive approach: “by its nature it is to be regarded as 
a plea which would become devoid of object if the requirement of the prior exhaustion of 
local remedies were fulfilled.”127  On the other hand, the TVPA version of exhaustion, in 
which the claim is adjudicated if brought up by the defendant as an affirmative defense, 
makes the doctrine operate more like a procedural motion such as forum non conveniens. 
¶66 Another relevant question about the applicability of exhaustion to ATCA is 
whether the international precedent cited to support its adoption applies to the type of 
litigants that use it.  Under ATCA, aliens can sue other aliens, including corporations, 
which are generally considered individuals in the eyes of the law. 128  In Interhandel 
(Switz v. U.S.), the International Court of Justice said, “the rule [of exhaustion] has been 
generally observed in cases in which a state has adopted the cause of its national whose 
rights are claimed to have been disregarded in another State in violation of international 
law.”129  
B. Conclusion: A Form of Exhaustion is Already Applied to ATCA Plaintiffs in the 
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens.  
¶67 The Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain can be optimistically 
considered a victory for human rights advocates who seek to use U.S. courts to redress 
violations that take place outside national boundaries.  On one hand, the decision limited 
ATCA claims to those “based on the present-day law of nations [that] rest[s] on a norm 
of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with specificity 
comparable to the features of 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.”130  At first 
blush, that requirement reads like a massive restriction of possible torts available under 
the statute, but the post-Filartiga ATCA jurisprudence had already restricted the types of 
international law violations cognizable in federal courts, excluding, for instance, 
environmental claims.131  However, the Supreme Court’s recognition of the evolutionary 
nature of ATCA vindicates two decades’ worth of ATCA jurisprudence and opens the 
door to the incorporation of new torts under the statute.  When considered in comparison 
to the counterva iling (and repeatedly rejected) argument from Tel-Oren that ATCA is 
purely jurisdictional and provides no private cause of action, 132 the restrictions in Sosa 
can be viewed as merely a codification of existing generally accepted principles.  
¶68 In fact, the one element of the Sosa decision that had the capacity to be truly 
revolutionary, the engrafting of an exhaustion requirement, was relegated to a footnote 
                                                 
127 Interhandel, 1959 I.C.J at 26. 
128 See Corrie, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 1026 (citing Diatronics Inc. v. Elbit Computers, 649 F. Supp. 122, 127-9 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986)). 
129 Interhandel, 1959 I.C.J. at 27. 
130 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. 
131 See supra  note 21. 
132 See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,  726 F.2d 774, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1982). See also  Reply Brief for the 
United Sates as Respondent Supporting Petitioner, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 2004 WL 577654 (March 23, 
2004). 
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because the instant case did not lend itself to such a discussion. 133  Sarei provided the first 
full discussion of the issue following Sosa, with the majority concluding that an 
exhaustion requirement should not be read into ATCA based on the lack of original 
legislative intent for such a requirement,134 the inapplicability of TVPA to ATCA 
claims,135 and from the fact that Congress failed to add an exhaustion requirement to 
ATCA when it created TVPA -- signaling that judicial discretion in dismissing a case for 
non-exhaustion of local remedies is disfavored.136  Due to the dearth of contemporary 
sources explaining ATCA’s goals and the brevity of the statute, divining what the 
statute’s authors meant has continually vexed courts.137  Since TVPA has been held to 
cleave off torture and extrajudicial killing from the ATCA, 138 the argument that TVPA 
shows that exhaustion belongs in ATCA causes of action is generally unpersuasive.  The 
treaties and conventions cited in support of the notion that exhaustion is an international 
norm are not clearly analogous to ATCA claims and the leading international law cases 
on the subject are divided on the issue of whether exhaustion is substantive or procedural.  
As a result, the state of international law with regard to exhaustion is not dispositive on 
the issue of whether exhaustion belongs in ATCA. 
¶69 Where the Sarei majority’s opposition to an exhaustion requirement is weakest is in 
the area of judicial discretion.  The court’s concern that proponents of an exhaustion 
requirement are “lulled into a false sense of familiarity” with the term is overblown.  
First, domestic exhaustion and the related domestic common law doctrine of forum non 
conveniens (“FNC”) are well-understood, with a large body of precedent from which to 
draw.  Second, FNC is in many ways parallel to the international law doctrine of 
exhaustion in form and effect.  The Sarei majority failed to see that the elements of 
exhaustion already exist in domestic common law, namely in the requirement that an 
adequate alternative forum be available for a suit to be dismissed on FNC grounds.  By 
dismissing the argument that determining the correct forum for a case is an issue of 
judicial discretion, the Sarei decision has ignored the fact that courts have already been 
performing all of the elements of exhaustion analysis under the banner of FNC.139  The 
“adequate alternative venue” requirement of FNC has been held to exclude foreign 
venues where justice would not be available due to corruption or intimidation, just as 
exhaustion claims have failed under TVPA’s statutory exhaustion requirement for the 
same reasons.140  The second part of the FNC test includes a list of public and private-
interest factors, many of which read like the list of reasons for an exhaustion requirement 
in the TVPA’s Senate report.141 
                                                 
133 See Sosa, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004). 
134 Sarei, 487 F.3d at 1215. 
135 Id. at 1218-1219. 
136 Id. at 1223. 
137 In IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1095) (the court stated: “[ATCA] is a kind of 
judicial Lohengren; although it has been with us since the first Judiciary Act … no one seems to know 
whence it came.”). 
138 See supra  note 88. 
139 See generally Reus, Judicial Discretion: A Comparative View of Forum Non Conveniens in the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and Germany, 13 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP . L.J. 455 (1994). 
140 See Abiola, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 838, Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995).  
141 See supra  note 87. 
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¶70 In the past, a motion to dismiss on FNC grounds has been a difficult hurdle for 
many ATCA plaintiffs to overcome.142  However, the fundamental lack of justice 
available in many courts that have jurisdiction where human rights violations take place 
may negate the benefits of better access to evidence and witnesses.  In cases of severe 
delay, such as in Xuncax, the most “easy, expeditious and inexpensive” forum is likely in 
a U.S. court.  143  As the precedent of TVPA’s exhaustion provision has shown, local 
remedies in countries where human rights violations have taken place are rarely 
“exhausted” in the manner of domestic administrative remedies;144 but are instead 
rejected outright, similar to venue choice in purely domestic FNC cases.145  When foreign 
courts are involved, the traditional FNC considerations are not limited to purely practical 
concerns, such as those listed in Gulf Oil.  In Mobil Tankers Co., S. A. v. Mene Grande 
Oil Co., a negligence claim, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals accepts the Gulf Oil 
factors in considering a defense motion to dismiss on FNC grounds, but puts them within 
the context that “[t]he ultimate inquiry is whether the retention of jurisdiction by the 
district court would best serve the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice.”146  
Clearly, the history of the TVPA’s exhaustion requirement shows that the guiding 
principle behind it is essentially that of FNC as interpreted in Mobil Tankers.   
¶71 The Senate Report accompanying the TVPA listed effectiveness and speed of the 
local remedy and the unfairness (synonymous with lack of justice) of the foreign 
jurisdiction as factors to be used when evaluating a defense of non-exhaustion. 147  These 
considerations are strikingly similar to the private interest factors of a FNC analysis.  
However, courts have not used TVPA exhaustion cases for guidance in evaluating the 
quality of a foreign jurisdiction while considering FNC motions under ATCA.  By 
splitting exhaustion off into a discrete question involving lawmakers’ intent and 
international law, the Sarei court has framed the issue in such a way as to discourage the 
meaningful ana lysis of whether exhaustion already exists and whether common law 
exhaustion (as part of FNC) can be bolstered by lessons learned from statutory 
exhaustion under TVPA. 
¶72 By considering exhaustion as a wholly discrete doctrine separate from FNC, with 
which it shares both goals and means, the Sarei court has increased the risk of a Supreme 
Court reversal.  In ATCA cases regarding human rights violations, FNC has been one of 
the main roadblocks to U.S. courts issuing decisions on the merits.148  Under TVPA, 
exhaustion defenses have been relatively ineffective.149  Had the Sarei court found it 
unnecessary to add an exhaustion requirement to ATCA because it already existed within 
FNC, it could have required the lower courts to consider, in their analysis of FNC, the 
factors commonly cited by courts evaluating exhaustion defenses in TVPA lawsuits -- 
                                                 
142 It has been suggested that “a majority” of the Gulf Oil factors pointed to the dismissal of Filartiga at the 
District Court level. See generally  Yale-Loehr, The Exhaustion of Local Remedies Rule and Forum Non 
Conveniens in International Litigation in U.S. Courts, 13 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 351, 370 (1980). 
143 See Abiola, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 838. 
144 See e.g., Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 325-29 (1988) (allowing a futility exception for an administrative 
exhaustion requirement). 
145 See Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995), Abiola, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 833. 
146 Mobil Tankers Co. v. Mene Grande Oil Co., 363 F.2d 611, 614 (3rd Cir.), cert denied 385 U.S. 945 
(1966).  For additional discussion of the role of justice in FNC, see e.g. note 142,Yale-Loehr at 366, n.90. 
147 See supra  note 86. 
148 See e.g. supra  note 76. 
149 See e.g. supra notes 114-115. 
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factors that are largely favorable to plaintiffs.  Should a future court decide that 
exhaustion is an affirmative defense separate from and in addition to FNC, plaintiffs 
would have to clear two hurdles, one relatively difficult (FNC) and one that is likely 
easier (exhaustion).  Failure to clear either hurdle means the end of the case in U.S. 
courts.  Should the precedent set by TVPA exhaustion analyses be incorporated into the 
FNC common law, the threat of a separate exhaustion requirement would be neutralized 
and the FNC requirement itself would be more favorable to plaintiffs. 
¶73 At the very least, the Sarei majority missed an opportunity to explain the difference 
it saw between FNC as applied to other causes of action and exhaustion as it would 
operate under ATCA.  At worst, the court may have exempted ATCA claims from FNC 
entirely because Congress failed to cover judicial discretion issues when it passed the 
statute over 200 years ago.150  In defending ATCA from the possibility of an exhaustion 
requirement as raised in Sosa, the Ninth Circuit split exhaustion from its traditional home 
within FNC, and in doing so, overlooked a way to end the exhaustion debate started in 
Sosa while creating a fairer standard for plaintiffs. 
                                                 
150 Sarei, 487 F.3d at 1218-19. 
